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Abstract: 
This paper develops a two sector model of endogenous economic growth with public capital 
where private goods and public investment goods are produced with different production 
technologies. The government buys public investment goods produced by private producers; 
and the government is a monopsonist in this market to determine the price. However, growth 
rate maximising buying price of public investment good is not identical with the competitive 
price of the final good and the growth rate maximising income tax rate in the steady state 
equilibrium is independent of the technology in public good production. It is also shown that 
the welfare maximising solution is not necessarily identical to the growth rate maximising 
solution even in the steady state equilibrium.  
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1. Introduction 
 The literature on growth theory emphasizes the pivotal role played by public capital in 
the process of fostering growth. World Bank (1994), identifies public capital as the ‘wheels’ 
of economic growth. In a seminal contribution, Barro (1990) makes the first attempt to 
incorporate the productive role of public infrastructure in an endogenous growth model; and 
also determines and analyses the properties of optimal income tax used to finance this 
productive public expenditure. Futagami et al. (1993), extends Barro (1990) model by 
considering public capital as a stock variable rather than a flow variable (as assumed by the 
latter). Other important contributions that followed these two models are, Eicher and 
Turnovsky (2000), Tsoukis and Miller (2003), Turnovsky (2000) and Irmen and Kuehnel 
(2009). Interestingly, in all these models, it is assumed, that producers of both the public 
good and the final private good use identical technology. The state buys public goods using 
tax revenue and then, freely provides the whole stock of public good to producers as public 
input.1 Moreover, the government chooses optimal tax rate such that the rate of growth and / 
or the welfare level is maximized.     
This type of modelling has two major problems. First of all, these models assume that 
the aggregate production functions of both goods are identical. In Barro’s own words, “As 
long as the government and the private sector have the same production functions, the results 
would be the same if the government buys private inputs and does its own production, instead 
of purchasing only final output from the private sector, as I assume.” However, this 
simplifying assumption is too simple to model the real world. Productive public capitals, such 
as, ports, roads, bridges, dams, rail etc. may have different input elasticities than from the 
input elasticities of other private goods, such as agricultural products, clothing, computers, 
bicycles etc. In fact, a fairly large number of contributions (see for example, Pereira and 
Roca-Sagales (2001), Pereira and Andraz (2007), Cantos et al. (2005), Ammad and Ahmed 
(2013), Annala et al. (2004) and Feng and Serletis (2013)) have empirically shown that 
output elasticities of public capital are very different for different sectors. For example, 
Pereira and Roca-Sagales (2001) has shown that the long term accumulated elasticities with 
respect to public capital are 0.81, 1.23 and 0.37 in manufacturing sector, construction sector 
and in service sector respectively.2 This implies that production functions are different for 
different sectors. Since aggregate production functions of public capital and of final private 
goods are weighted averages of production functions of these sectors with different sets of 
weights; so identical aggregate production functions for final private good and public capital 
is hardly possible. This in turn implies that it is important to derive the properties of optimal 
income tax rate where private goods and public goods are produced with different production 
technologies. Few papers, such as Dasgupta (1999, 2001), Dasgupta and Shimomura (2006),                                                         
1 In Barro’s own words, “But conceptually, it is satisfactory to think of the government as doing no production 
and owning no capital. Then the government just buys a flow of output (including services of highways, sewers, 
battleships, etc.) from the private sector. These purchased services, which the government makes available to 
households, correspond to the input that matters for private production ……..”.   
2 Though these are long term accumulated elasticities with respect to public capital, but their very different 
values clearly indicate that the direct output elasticities with respect to public capital are very different. 
Otherwise, the long term accumulated elasticities would have been the same.   
Pintea and Turnovsky (2006), Turnsovsky and Pintea (2006) consider different production 
functions for producing private goods and public goods. However, Pintea and Turnovsky 
(2006) and Turnsovsky and Pintea (2006) do not derive the optimal tax rate analytically. On 
the other hand, Dasgupta (2001) and Dasgupta and Shimomura (2006) do not consider 
income taxation3. Only Dasgupta (1999), derives the optimal tax rate. However, Dasgupta 
(1999) shows that the optimal income tax rate is zero and the government should earn the 
entire revenue only by charging the private sector firms for usage of public services on a per 
unit basis. This may be impossible to implement when public services are non-rival and non-
excludable in nature, since, firms will try to take a free ride. So Barro (1990) model’s idea of 
freely distributing services of public capital and of charging income taxes to finance its cost 
is better from the viewpoint of implementation. 
The second problem with Barro (1990) type of modelling is more severe. In this entire 
genre of literature, it is assumed that the government buys public goods from private 
producers at a given price and this price is equal to the competitive price of the final good. 
However, why the government should act as a price-taker is not clear. The government is the 
only buyer; and so it should act as a monopsonist and thus use the relative price as a tool to 
maximize its objective. 
These two issues motivate us to develop the present model. Otherwise building 
closely on Futagami et al. (1993), we assume a two sector economy with different production 
functions for producing the final good and a public investment good. Here, we attempt not 
only to analyse the properties of optimal income tax rate used to finance investment in public 
capital but also analyse the properties of the optimal buying price of the public investment 
good. In this model, the private sector produces public investment good and sells it to the 
government who has a monopsony power to set the buying price. Thus, this price is also used 
to control allocation of resources between these two sectors. 
We derive many interesting results from this model. First of all, unlike Barro (1990) 
type of modelling with one sector, the government cannot control the quantity of productive 
public capital formation using income tax rate. Rather, the government can affect 
intersectoral allocation of resources by altering the buying price of public investment good. 
This is so because, in a two sector economy, resource allocation depends upon the marginal 
productivity of the resources across sectors. As the income tax rate reduces the value of 
marginal productivity in the same ratio across all sectors and the value of marginal 
productivity depends upon the price of the good produced, so the government in a two sector 
economy can affect the intersectoral allocation of resources by altering the buying price of 
the public investment good via the value of marginal productivity. Secondly, growth rate 
maximising buying price of public investment good is not necessarily equal to the 
competitive price of final good. In fact, if we assume identical production functions for both 
goods like Barro (1990) type of modelling, then also this growth rate maximising buying 
price of public investment good is not necessarily equal to the competitive price of the final 
good. This result stems from the fact, that in case the productivity of private capital is lesser                                                         
3 Dasgupta and Shimomura (2006) considers lump sum taxes but not per unit income tax.  
(greater) than the productivity of public capital, a benevolent state would choose an optimal 
price of the public investment good greater (lesser) than the price of the final good to attract 
(drive away) resources and to enhance its (final good’s) production. Thus, the optimal buying 
price of the public investment good can become a mechanism for promoting economic 
growth. Thirdly, the growth rate maximising income tax rate is equal to the elasticity of 
output with respect to public capital in the production of final private goods only but is 
independent of the production technology to produce public investment good. This is so 
because, public investment good sector uses public capital as input only to produce additional 
public capital. There exists only one final good sector to receive the service of public capital 
free of cost. If there is exchange, it is optimal for the final good sector to buy public 
investment good at the competitive price. So in the absence of exchange, it is optimal to 
charge a tax rate which is equal to the competitive output share of public capital in the final 
good sector. As a result, optimal tax rate is independent of the production technology of 
public capital. Lastly, welfare maximising buying price of public capital, welfare maximising 
income tax rate and welfare maximising allocation of private capital are different from their 
corresponding growth rate maximising values even in the steady state growth equilibrium. 
However, if we consider identical production functions for both goods, then welfare 
maximising solutions and growth rate maximising solutions become identical. Since Barro 
(1990) and Futagami et al. (1993) consider identical production functions for both goods, so 
in those models, growth rate maximising fiscal policies are identical with welfare maximising 
fiscal policies in the steady state equilibrium. Thus the present model generalises these 
previous result. These results are new in the literature of endogenous growth with public 
capital.   
Rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the structure of the 
model. Section 3 deals with steady state growth equilibrium and growth rate maximizing 
policies. Section 4 compares between growth rate maximizing fiscal policies and optimal 
(welfare maximizing) fiscal policies in the steady state equilibrium; and section 5 concludes 
the paper.    
 
2. The Model 
The representative household-producer produces both final good and public 
investment good using private capital and public capital. Public investment good is defined as 
the additional stock of non-rival public capital. Production functions of two sectors with 
different technologies are given by           𝑌𝑌 = 𝐴𝐴(𝜃𝜃𝐾𝐾)𝛼𝛼𝐺𝐺1−𝛼𝛼     where     𝛼𝛼 ∈ (0,1)    and   𝐴𝐴 > 0         ;                                             (1) 
and           ?̇?𝐺 = 𝐵𝐵[(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝐾𝐾]𝛽𝛽𝐺𝐺1−𝛽𝛽     where     𝛽𝛽 ∈ (0,1)    and     𝐵𝐵 > 0        .                               (2) 
Here, Y, K, G and θ denote level of output of final good, stock of private capital, stock of 
public capital and the share of private capital allocated to production of final goods 
respectively. ?̇?𝐺 represents the level of output of public investment good. The government sets 
the relative price of ?̇?𝐺; and the household–producer determines the allocation of resources 
between production of these two goods. Public capital does not depreciate over time.   
 The government buys all ?̇?𝐺 at the relative price, µ; and freely provides the whole 
stock of G to the household-producers, thereby incurring an expenditure equal to 𝜇𝜇?̇?𝐺. On the 
other hand, the government charges an income tax at the rate, τ, on the representative 
household producer’s total income, (𝑌𝑌 + 𝜇𝜇?̇?𝐺). So the government’s balanced budget equation 
becomes            𝜏𝜏𝑌𝑌 + 𝜏𝜏𝜇𝜇?̇?𝐺 = 𝜇𝜇?̇?𝐺  .                                                                                                                         (3) 
The representative household is infinitely lived; and she derives instantaneous utility 
from consumption of final goods only; and maximizes her discounted present value of 
instantaneous utility subject to her intertemporal budget constraint. The optimization problem 
is given by the following.  
          𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀� 𝑐𝑐1−𝜎𝜎 − 11 − 𝜎𝜎 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌∞
0
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑                                                                                                            (4) 
subject to,      ?̇?𝐾 = (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝑌𝑌 + (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝜇𝜇?̇?𝐺 − 𝑐𝑐        ;                                                              (5)                          𝐾𝐾(0) = 𝐾𝐾0      ;        
          and       𝜃𝜃 ∈ [0 , 1]   .      
Here c is the level of consumption of the final good and 𝐾𝐾0 is historically given initial 
private capital stock. 𝜎𝜎 represents the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to 
consumption and ρ denotes the constant rate of discount. Savings is always invested; and 
there is no depreciation of private capital.    
 Here c and θ are two control variables and K is the only state variable. Solving this 
dynamic optimisation problem, we obtain4            (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼𝜃𝜃𝛼𝛼−1𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼𝐺𝐺1−𝛼𝛼 = 𝜇𝜇(1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐵𝐵𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝛽𝛽−1𝐾𝐾𝛽𝛽𝐺𝐺1−𝛽𝛽     ;                                       (6) 
and 
          ?̇?𝑐
𝑐𝑐
= (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼𝜃𝜃𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼−1𝐺𝐺1−𝛼𝛼 + 𝜇𝜇(1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐵𝐵𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝛽𝛽𝐾𝐾𝛽𝛽−1𝐺𝐺1−𝛽𝛽 − 𝜌𝜌 
𝜎𝜎
      .                    (7) 
Equation (6) shows the efficient allocation of private capital between two sectors. It implies 
that the after tax value of the marginal product of private capital is same in both these two 
sectors. Equation (7) describes the demand rate of growth of consumption which is defined as                                                         
4 Derivation of equations (6) and (7) are shown in the appendix.  
the excess of after tax marginal return of private capital accumulation over the rate of 
discount normalized with respect to the elasticity of marginal utility.   
 
3. The Steady State Equilibrium 
 The equations of motion of the system are given by equations (2), (5) and (7). In the 
steady-state growth equilibrium,  
          𝑔𝑔 = ?̇?𝐺
𝐺𝐺
= ?̇?𝐾
𝐾𝐾
= ?̇?𝑐
𝑐𝑐
          ,                                                                                                                 (8) 
where g is the balanced growth rate of the economy.  
Now, from equation (6), we obtain    
          (1 − 𝜃𝜃)1−𝛽𝛽
𝜃𝜃1−𝛼𝛼
= 𝜇𝜇𝐵𝐵𝛽𝛽
𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼
�
𝐾𝐾
𝐺𝐺
�
𝛽𝛽−𝛼𝛼         ;                                                                                           (6𝑀𝑀) 
Equation (6a) shows that the allocation share of private capital to the final goods sector, θ, is 
independent of the income tax rate, τ. This implies that the government cannot control the 
allocation of resources between two sectors and thereby production of public investment 
good using τ. In Barro (1990), Futagami et al. (1993) and in their extended one sector models, 
the income tax rate, 𝜏𝜏, is a tool to determine the level of production of public investment 
good. However, in this model, 𝜏𝜏 does not play any such role but the relative price, 𝜇𝜇, can be 
used as a tool for this purpose. As equation (6a) shows, that a change in µ has two different 
effects on θ in the steady – state equilibrium. First, it has a direct negative effect obtained for 
a given value of (K/G), i.e., the ratio of two types of capital. However, (K/G) also changes 
with a change in µ5. So in the case of identical production technologies, i.e., A = B and α = β, 
the effect through change in (K/G) vanishes and θ varies inversely with the buying price of 
public investment good, µ. This is shown below. 
          �1 − 𝜃𝜃
𝜃𝜃
�
1−𝛼𝛼 = 𝜇𝜇     .                                                                                                                   (6𝑏𝑏) 
The intuition behind this result is as follows. The income tax rate reduces the marginal 
productivity of capital in both sectors in the same proportion. So 𝜃𝜃 becomes independent of τ. 
However, given other things constant, an increase in 𝜇𝜇 raises the after tax value of marginal 
product of private capital in the public good producing sector; and so the share of private 
capital is increased in that sector. Equation (6b) also shows that if we assume 𝜇𝜇 = 1 along 
with identical production functions like Barro (1990) type of models, then 𝜃𝜃 = ½. This in turn 
implies that, if the relative price is equal to unity, private capital will be allocated equally 
between two sectors.                                                           
5 We cannot determine analytically the effect of µ on the steady state (G/K). However, this effect is not 
important for the main results of this paper and so we overlooked it.    
Using equations (1), (2) and (3), we obtain 
          � 𝜏𝜏1 − 𝜏𝜏� = 𝜇𝜇𝐵𝐵(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝜃𝜃𝛼𝛼 �𝐾𝐾𝐺𝐺�𝛽𝛽−𝛼𝛼            .                                                                                   (9) 
Using equations (6a) and (9), we obtain  
          𝜏𝜏 = 𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝜃𝜃)
𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝜃𝜃) + 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃 < 1          .                                                                                                (9𝑀𝑀) 
Equation (9a) shows that τ varies inversely with θ. Equations (6a) and (9a) simultaneously 
indicate that a change in µ has a direct positive effect obtained for a given (K/G), and an 
ambiguous indirect effect working through change in (K/G). However in the case of identical 
production functions, τ becomes independent of (K/G) and varies positively with µ. This is so 
because an increase in the relative buying price, 𝜇𝜇, raises the government expenditure in a 
higher proportion than the government revenue; and to balance the budget, the revenue must 
rise. A rise in µ is also associated with a fall in θ and hence a fall in Y and a rise in ?̇?𝐺. So the 
tax rate, τ, must rise to balance the budget. Since a fall in θ is associated with a fall in Y and a 
rise in ?̇?𝐺, so τ is inversely related with θ.  
The above discussion can be summarized as the following proposition.     
Proposition 1: Government cannot (can) affect intersectoral allocation of private capital by 
changing the income tax rate (relative price of public investment good). In case of identical 
production functions, the budget balancing income tax rate as well as the allocative share of 
private capital to the public investment good producing sector vary positively with the 
government’s buying price of public investment good.    
Now, Using equations (2) and (8), we have  
          �𝐺𝐺
𝐾𝐾
� = (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝐵𝐵1𝛽𝛽
𝑔𝑔
1
𝛽𝛽
           .                                                                                                         (2𝑀𝑀) 
 Now using equations (2a), (6), (7), (8) and (9), we have6    
          𝜌𝜌 + 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔 = 𝛽𝛽𝐵𝐵1𝛽𝛽𝜇𝜇𝑔𝑔𝛽𝛽−1𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛼𝛼 �𝐵𝐵 𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼)𝛽𝛽 𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼(𝑔𝑔) 𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼) � 𝜇𝜇𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼� 11−𝛼𝛼�
              .                                                           (10) 
Equation (10) solves for the balanced growth rate, g; and this equation also shows the nature 
of the relationship between the buying price of the public investment good, 𝜇𝜇, and the 
balanced growth rate, g. Here µ is not a parameter in this model. µ is an instrument to solve 
                                                        
6 Derivation of equation (10) is shown in appendix.  
the optimisation problem of the government. Ideally, the government’s objective should be to 
maximise the welfare level of the representative household, 𝜔𝜔, given by  
          𝜔𝜔 = 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀{𝑐𝑐} � 𝑐𝑐1−𝜎𝜎 − 11 − 𝜎𝜎 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌∞
0
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑           .                                                                                    (11) 
Unfortunately, we cannot solve for the welfare maximising buying price of the public 
investment good due to technical complications. Rather, we solve for its steady-state 
equilibrium growth rate maximising solution in this section; and examine, in the next section, 
whether it deviates from its welfare maximising solution. Now we maximize g given by 
equation (10) with respect to µ; and, using the first order condition, we obtain the following.7   
          𝜇𝜇 = 𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝛼𝛼)1−𝛼𝛼
𝛼𝛼1−2𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵
𝛼𝛼
𝛽𝛽𝑔𝑔
𝛽𝛽−𝛼𝛼
𝛽𝛽 𝛽𝛽𝛼𝛼
       .                                                                                                      (12) 
 Using equations (10) and (12), we have  
          (𝜌𝜌 + 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔)𝑔𝑔1−𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽 = 𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝛼𝛼)1−𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽1−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼2𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵1−𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽              .                                                      (13) 
Equation (13) solves for the maximum value of 𝑔𝑔, which is the endogenous rate of growth of 
the economy in the steady-state equilibrium.  
Denoting this maximum value of 𝑔𝑔 by 𝑔𝑔∗ and putting it in equation (12), we obtain8   
          𝜇𝜇∗ = 𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝛼𝛼)1−𝛼𝛼
𝛼𝛼1−2𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵
𝛼𝛼
𝛽𝛽(𝑔𝑔∗)𝛽𝛽−𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽 𝛽𝛽𝛼𝛼        .                                                                                               (14) 
This equation (14) shows that the growth rate maximising 𝜇𝜇 is not necessarily equal to unity, 
i.e., the competitive price of the final good. Even if we consider identical production 
technology in both the sectors, i.e., A = B and 𝛼𝛼 = 𝛽𝛽, then also  
          𝜇𝜇∗ = �1 − 𝛼𝛼
𝛼𝛼
�
1−𝛼𝛼        ;                                                                                                            (14𝑀𝑀) 
and hence 𝜇𝜇∗ = 1 if and only if 𝛼𝛼 = 1/2, i.e., if and only if production function is symmetric 
in terms of its arguments. This equation also shows that 𝜇𝜇∗ varies inversely with α. This is so 
because, suppose α decreases, thereby implying that private capital, K, (public capital, G,) 
becomes less (more) productive. The optimal value of the price of the public investment 
good, 𝜇𝜇∗ rises in order to allocate more resources towards public capital formation. So the 
government may set higher buying prices of public investment good to enhance economic 
                                                        
7 Derivation of equation (12) is shown in the appendix.  
8 The second order condition of maximisation of growth rate with respect to 𝜇𝜇 is satisfied. From equation (10), it 
can be shown very easily that 𝑑𝑑
2𝑔𝑔
𝑑𝑑𝜇𝜇2
< 0 when equation (12) holds.   
growth even the cost of its provision is higher. This result is stated in the following 
proposition.  
Proposition 2: The steady-state equilibrium growth rate maximising buying price of public 
investment good is not necessarily equal to the competitive price of the final good. The 
equality is obtained if production technology in both the sectors are identical and symmetric.  
In Barro (1990) and Futagami et al. (1993), where production functions are identical, 
this symmetry assumption is not made but the government’s buying price of public good is 
set to be equal to the competitive price of the final good.     
Equations (2), (6), (9) and (14) can be used to obtain     
          𝜃𝜃∗ = 𝛼𝛼2
𝛼𝛼2 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝛼𝛼)         ;                                                                                                      (15) 
and           𝜏𝜏∗ = 1 − 𝛼𝛼        .                                                                                                                          (16) 
𝜃𝜃∗ represents the growth rate maximising allocation of private capital to the final goods 
producing sector in the steady state growth equilibrium. Equation (15) shows that 𝜃𝜃∗ varies 
inversely with β and positively with α. This is so because, as β (α) rises, productivity of 
private capital rises in the public investment good (final good) sector relative to the other 
sector; and, as a result, allocative share of private capital to public investment good (final 
good) sector goes up. In the case of identical production technology, 𝜃𝜃∗ = 𝛼𝛼. This is stated in 
the following proposition. 
Proposition 3: The growth rate maximising allocative share of private capital to final good 
(public investment good) producing sector varies positively (inversely) with the private 
capital elasticity of output of final good and varies inversely (positively) with the private 
capital elasticity of output of public investment good.  
Equation (16) does not involve β. So this leads to the following proposition.  
Proposition 4: The steady state equilibrium growth rate maximising income tax rate is equal 
to the elasticity of output of final good with respect to public capital but is independent of the 
production technology in the public investment good producing sector.  
 Public investment good sector uses public capital as input only to produce additional 
public capital. There exists only one final good sector to receive the service of public capital 
free of cost. If there is exchange, it is optimal for the final good sector to buy public 
investment good at the competitive price. So in the absence of exchange, it is optimal to 
charge a tax rate which is equal to the competitive output share of public capital in the final 
good sector.      
 In Barro (1990) and Futagami et al. (1993), input elasticities of output are same in 
both the sectors. So this problem does not arise.   
 4. Welfare Maximization 
 In this section, we examine whether the growth rate maximising buying price of 
public investment good is identical with the welfare maximising buying price of public 
investment good. We use equations (1), (2), (5), (6), (7), (9) and (11) to obtain the welfare 
level of the representative household, denoted by 𝜔𝜔. This is identical to her discounted 
present value instantaneous utilities over the infinite horizon. It is derived as9  
          𝜔𝜔 = ⎣⎢⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
𝜌𝜌
𝛼𝛼 + 𝑔𝑔 �𝜎𝜎𝛼𝛼 − 1� + (𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑔𝑔2𝛽𝛽−1−𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼) 𝐴𝐴 1𝛼𝛼−1𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼−21−𝛼𝛼𝜇𝜇2−𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵 1𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼)𝛽𝛽2−𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼
�1 + 𝐵𝐵 𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼)(𝑔𝑔) 𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼) �𝜇𝜇𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼�
1
1−𝛼𝛼
� �𝛽𝛽 + 𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵 𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼)(𝑔𝑔) 𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼) �𝜇𝜇𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼�
1
1−𝛼𝛼
�
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
1−𝜎𝜎
𝐾𝐾0
𝜎𝜎−1(1 − 𝜎𝜎)[𝜌𝜌 − 𝑔𝑔(1 − 𝜎𝜎)]+ 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑      .                                                                                                         (17) 
If 𝜎𝜎 > 𝛼𝛼 and if 𝜌𝜌 − 𝑔𝑔(1 − 𝜎𝜎) > 0, then equation (17) shows that 𝜔𝜔 varies positively with g 
when α = β. So the growth rate maximising solution is identical to the welfare maximising 
solution in the steady state equilibrium when α = β, i.e., production technologies are identical 
in these two sectors. However, when α ≠ β, i.e., when production technologies are not 
identical, then the welfare maximising solution is not identical to the growth rate maximising 
solution even in the steady state equilibrium. From equation (17), we differentiate 𝜔𝜔 with 
respect to 𝜇𝜇 and then evaluate it at 𝜇𝜇 = 𝜇𝜇∗. Hence we obtain10 
          𝑑𝑑𝜔𝜔
𝑑𝑑𝜇𝜇
�
𝜇𝜇=𝜇𝜇∗
=
⎩
⎪⎪
⎨
⎪⎪
⎧
�
𝜌𝜌
𝛼𝛼 + 𝑔𝑔∗ �𝜎𝜎𝛼𝛼 − 1� + 𝐴𝐴(𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑔𝑔∗𝛼𝛼−1𝛽𝛽 𝐵𝐵1−𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽 𝛽𝛽1−𝛼𝛼[𝛼𝛼2 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝛼𝛼)](1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝛼𝛼−2𝛼𝛼1−2𝛼𝛼�−𝜎𝜎
𝐾𝐾0
𝜎𝜎−1[𝜌𝜌 − 𝑔𝑔∗(1 − 𝜎𝜎)]
⎭
⎪⎪
⎬
⎪⎪
⎫
 
                                                         .     �(𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑔𝑔∗𝛽𝛽−1𝛽𝛽 𝐵𝐵1𝛽𝛽𝛼𝛼2𝛽𝛽[𝛼𝛼2 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝛼𝛼)]2 �        .                                            (18) 
We assume 𝜎𝜎 > 𝛼𝛼 and 𝜌𝜌 > 𝑔𝑔∗(1 − 𝜎𝜎). This ensures that the right hand side of equation (18) 
is positive (zero) (negative) when α > (=) (<) β11. This implies that the welfare maximising 
value of 𝜇𝜇 is higher (lower) than the growth rate maximising value of 𝜇𝜇 even in the steady 
                                                        
9 See appendix for derivation of equation (17).  
10 See appendix for derivation of equation (18).  
11 When β > α, then also the first term in the R.H.S. of equation (18) is positive as 𝑐𝑐0 cannot be negative.   
state equilibrium when the final private good sector is more (less) private capital intensive 
than the public investment good sector. We refer welfare maximising 𝜇𝜇 as ?̅?𝜇 .    
 Now, we compare growth rate maximising solutions 𝜏𝜏∗ and 𝜃𝜃∗ to welfare maximising 
solutions 𝜏𝜏̅ and ?̅?𝜃. When α > β , then 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝜇𝜇
�
𝜇𝜇=𝜇𝜇∗
 is positive and as a result, ?̅?𝜇 > 𝜇𝜇∗. So the 
growth rate corresponding to ?̅?𝜇, i.e., ?̅?𝑔, is less than 𝑔𝑔∗ as 𝑔𝑔∗ is the maximum value of 
balanced growth rate. As a result, ?̅?𝜇?̅?𝑔
𝛽𝛽−𝛼𝛼
𝛽𝛽 > 𝜇𝜇∗𝑔𝑔∗𝛽𝛽−𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽 .  
 Using equations (2a), (6a) and (9), we obtain12   
          𝜃𝜃 = 11 + 𝐵𝐵 𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼)(𝑔𝑔) 𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼) �𝜇𝜇𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼�
1
1−𝛼𝛼
            ;                                                                                     (19) 
and 
          𝜏𝜏 = 𝛼𝛼 𝐵𝐵
𝛼𝛼
𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼)(𝑔𝑔) 𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼) �𝜇𝜇𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼�
1
1−𝛼𝛼
𝛼𝛼
𝐵𝐵
𝛼𝛼
𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼)(𝑔𝑔) 𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼) �𝜇𝜇𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼�
1
1−𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 < 1         .                                                                             (20) 
Equations (19) and (20) show that θ and τ vary inversely and positively with 𝜇𝜇𝑔𝑔
𝛽𝛽−𝛼𝛼
𝛽𝛽  
respectively. So welfare maximising θ, i.e., ?̅?𝜃, is less than 𝜃𝜃∗ but welfare maximising τ, i.e., 
𝜏𝜏̅, is higher than 𝜏𝜏∗. Similarly, when β > α, then 𝜇𝜇∗ > ?̅?𝜇 and 𝑔𝑔∗ > ?̅?𝑔. This implies that, 
?̅?𝜇?̅?𝑔
𝛽𝛽−𝛼𝛼
𝛽𝛽 < 𝜇𝜇∗𝑔𝑔∗𝛽𝛽−𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽 ; and as a result, ?̅?𝜃 is greater than 𝜃𝜃∗ but 𝜏𝜏̅ is less than 𝜏𝜏∗.    
 Barro (1990) and Futagami et al. (1993) show that growth rate maximising income tax 
rate is identical to the welfare maximising income tax rate in the steady state equilibrium. 
However, we find that the welfare maximising solution is different from the growth rate 
maximising solution even in the steady state equilibrium when we consider different 
production functions for different goods. However these two solutions are always identical 
with identical production technology. So our result generalises the result of Barro (1990) and 
Futagami et al. (1993). This result is stated in the following proposition.  
Proposition 5: When the final good sector is more (less) private capital intensive than the 
public investment good sector, welfare maximising buying price of public investment good, 
income tax rate and the allocation share of private capital to the public investment good 
sector exceeds (falls short of) their corresponding growth rate maximising values even in the 
steady state equilibrium.                                                            
12 See appendix for derivation of equations (19) and (20).  
 5. Conclusions 
This paper constructs a simple two sector endogenous growth model with public 
capital; and derives the properties of optimal fiscal policies in the steady state equilibrium. 
Both the final good and the public investment good are produced by the private sector using 
different production technologies. However, in this model, the government buys public good 
from private producers at a monopsony price and this buying price is a tool to control 
allocation of resources between these two sectors. This is how the present model differs from 
models like Barro (1990), Futagami et al. (1993) etc.   
 Various interesting findings are obtained here. First, the government can affect inter-
sectoral allocation of private capital not by changing the income tax rate but by altering the 
buying price of public investment good. Secondly, growth rate maximising buying price of 
public investment good is not necessarily equal to the competitive price of the final good 
even in the case with identical production technologies. Thirdly, the growth rate maximising 
income tax rate is equal to the elasticity of output of final good with respect to public capital 
but is independent of the production technology of public good. At last, welfare maximising 
solutions are different from growth rate maximising solutions even in the steady state 
equilibrium.     
This model can be extended in various possible directions. One very pertinent 
direction will be to incorporate the congestion effect of capital on productivity. Moreover, 
non-productive public services can directly affect households’ utility. Political incentives 
remain a powerful alternative that can replace our assumption of a benevolent government in 
this set up. All these remain as possible projects for future research.  
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Appendix: 
Derivation of equations (6) and (7): 
Using equations (4) and (5), we construct the Current Value Hamiltonian as given by 
          𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐 = 𝑐𝑐1−𝜎𝜎 − 11 − 𝜎𝜎 + 𝜆𝜆�(1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝑌𝑌 + (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝜇𝜇?̇?𝐺 − 𝑐𝑐�       .                                                     (𝐴𝐴. 1) 
Here 𝜆𝜆 is the co-state variable. Incorporating equations (1) and (2) in equation (A.1); and then 
maximising it with respect to c and 𝜃𝜃, we obtain following first order conditions.            𝑐𝑐−𝜎𝜎 − 𝜆𝜆 = 0     ;                                                                                                                        (𝐴𝐴. 2) 
and           𝜆𝜆(1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐴𝐴(𝐾𝐾)𝛼𝛼𝐺𝐺1−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝜃𝜃𝛼𝛼−1 = 𝜆𝜆𝜇𝜇(1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐵𝐵[𝐾𝐾]𝛽𝛽𝐺𝐺1−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝛽𝛽−1        .                   (𝐴𝐴. 3) 
From equation (A.3), we obtain equation (6) in the body of the paper.    
Again from equation (A.1), we have  
          ?̇?𝜆
𝜆𝜆
= 𝜌𝜌 − (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼−1𝐺𝐺1−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝜃𝜃𝛼𝛼 − 𝜇𝜇(1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐵𝐵𝐾𝐾𝛽𝛽−1𝐺𝐺1−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝛽𝛽      ;                 (𝐴𝐴. 4) 
and from equation (A.2), we have  
          ?̇?𝜆
𝜆𝜆
= −𝜎𝜎 ?̇?𝑐
𝑐𝑐
        .                                                                                                                          (𝐴𝐴. 5) 
Using equations (A.4) and (A.5), we have equation (7) in the body of the paper.  
Derivation of equation (10): 
From equation (7), we have  
          𝜌𝜌 + 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔 = (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼𝜃𝜃𝛼𝛼 �𝐺𝐺
𝐾𝐾
�
1−𝛼𝛼 + 𝜇𝜇(1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐵𝐵𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝛽𝛽 �𝐺𝐺
𝐾𝐾
�
1−𝛽𝛽         .                     (𝐴𝐴. 6) 
From equation (2), we have  
          �𝐺𝐺
𝐾𝐾
� = 𝐵𝐵1𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃)
𝑔𝑔
1
𝛽𝛽
         .                                                                                                         (𝐴𝐴. 7) 
From equations (2), (6), (9), (A.6) and (A.7), we obtain equation (10) in the body of the 
paper. 
Derivation of equation (12): 
Taking log on both sides of equation (10) and then differentiating it with respect to 𝜇𝜇 and 
assuming 𝑑𝑑𝑔𝑔
𝑑𝑑𝜇𝜇
= 0, we obtain  
          1
𝜇𝜇
= 𝛼𝛼1 − 𝛼𝛼 𝜇𝜇
𝛼𝛼
1−𝛼𝛼 �
𝐵𝐵
𝛼𝛼
𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼)𝛽𝛽 𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼(𝑔𝑔) 𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼) � 1𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼�
1
1−𝛼𝛼
�
1 + 𝛼𝛼 �𝐵𝐵 𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼)𝛽𝛽 𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼(𝑔𝑔) 𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼) � 𝜇𝜇𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼� 11−𝛼𝛼�
           .                                                             (𝐴𝐴. 8) 
From equation (A.8), we obtain equation (12) in the body of the paper.  
Derivation of equation (17): 
From equation (11), we obtain  
          𝜔𝜔 = 𝑐𝑐01−𝜎𝜎[𝜌𝜌 − 𝑔𝑔(1 − 𝜎𝜎)](1 − 𝜎𝜎) + 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑      .                                                                   (𝐴𝐴. 9) 
Here, 𝑐𝑐(0) = 𝑐𝑐0.  
From equation (5), we obtain 
          𝑐𝑐0 = 𝐾𝐾0 �(1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐴𝐴(𝜃𝜃)𝛼𝛼 �𝐺𝐺0𝐾𝐾0�1−𝛼𝛼 + (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝜇𝜇𝐵𝐵(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝛽𝛽 �𝐺𝐺0𝐾𝐾0�1−𝛽𝛽 − 𝑔𝑔�        .         (𝐴𝐴. 10) 
Using equations (7) and (A.10), we obtain  
          𝑐𝑐0 = 𝐾𝐾0 �𝜌𝜌 + 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔𝛼𝛼 + (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝜇𝜇𝐵𝐵(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝛽𝛽 �𝐺𝐺0𝐾𝐾0�1−𝛽𝛽 �𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽𝛼𝛼 � − 𝑔𝑔�        .                     (𝐴𝐴. 11) 
Using equations (2) and (A.11), we obtain   
          𝑐𝑐0 = 𝐾𝐾0 �𝜌𝜌 + 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔𝛼𝛼 + (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝜇𝜇𝐵𝐵(1 − 𝜃𝜃)�𝐵𝐵1𝛽𝛽
𝑔𝑔
1
𝛽𝛽
�
1−𝛽𝛽
�
𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽
𝛼𝛼
� − 𝑔𝑔�      .                      (𝐴𝐴. 12) 
Using equations (2), (6), (9) and (A.12), we obtain    
          𝑐𝑐0 = 𝐾𝐾0
⎩
⎪⎪
⎨
⎪⎪
⎧
𝜌𝜌
𝛼𝛼
+ 𝑔𝑔 �𝜎𝜎
𝛼𝛼
− 1� + (𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑔𝑔2𝛽𝛽−1−𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼) 𝐴𝐴 1𝛼𝛼−1𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼−21−𝛼𝛼𝜇𝜇2−𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵 1𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼)𝛽𝛽2−𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼
�1 + 𝐵𝐵 𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼)(𝑔𝑔) 𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼) �𝜇𝜇𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼�
1
1−𝛼𝛼
� �𝛽𝛽 + 𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵 𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼)(𝑔𝑔) 𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼) �𝜇𝜇𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼�
1
1−𝛼𝛼
�
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⎬
⎪⎪
⎫  
                                                                                                                                                  .          (𝐴𝐴. 13) 
Using equations (A.9) and (A.13), we obtain equation (17) in the body of the paper.  
Derivation of equation (18): 
Differentiating equation (17) with respect to 𝜇𝜇 and evaluating it at 𝜇𝜇 = 𝜇𝜇∗, we obtain 
          𝑑𝑑𝜔𝜔
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⎫   .   (𝐴𝐴. 14) 
Now, from equations (2), (6) and (9), we find that the last bracket term is equal to 
�
1
𝜇𝜇∗
� �
2−𝛼𝛼
1−𝛼𝛼
−
1
1−𝛼𝛼
[(1 − 𝜃𝜃∗) + 𝜏𝜏∗]�. Again, from equations (2) and (6), it appears that �1 +
𝐵𝐵
𝛼𝛼
𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼)(𝑔𝑔∗) 𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼) �𝜇𝜇∗𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼 �
1
1−𝛼𝛼� is equal to � 1
𝜃𝜃∗
�; and from equations (2), (6) and (9), we find that �𝛽𝛽 +
𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵
𝛼𝛼
𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼)(𝑔𝑔∗) 𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼) �𝜇𝜇∗𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼 �
1
1−𝛼𝛼� is equal to 𝛼𝛼(1−𝜃𝜃∗)
𝜃𝜃∗𝜏𝜏∗
. Incorporating all these equalities and putting values of 
𝜇𝜇∗, 𝜏𝜏∗ and 𝜃𝜃∗ from equations (14), (15) and (16), we obtain equation (18).   
Derivations of equations (19) and (20): 
From equation (2), we obtain  
          𝐺𝐺
𝐾𝐾
= 𝐵𝐵1𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝑔𝑔−1𝛽𝛽            .                                                                                                 (𝐴𝐴. 15) 
Using equations (6) and (A.15), we obtain   
          (1 − 𝜃𝜃)1−𝛼𝛼
𝜃𝜃1−𝛼𝛼
= 𝜇𝜇𝑔𝑔𝛽𝛽−𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽 𝐵𝐵𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽
𝐴𝐴
𝛽𝛽
𝛼𝛼
             .                                                                                   (𝐴𝐴. 16) 
From equation (A.16), we obtain equation (19) in the body of the article. 
Now, from equation (9) and (A.15), we obtain   
          � 𝜏𝜏1 − 𝜏𝜏� = 𝜇𝜇(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝜃𝜃𝛼𝛼 𝑔𝑔𝛽𝛽−𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽 𝐵𝐵𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽           .                                                                               (𝐴𝐴. 17) 
Using equations (A.16) and (A.17), we obtain    
          � 𝜏𝜏1 − 𝜏𝜏� = 𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽 𝐵𝐵 𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼)(𝑔𝑔) 𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽(1−𝛼𝛼) �𝜇𝜇𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼�
1
1−𝛼𝛼             .                                                                         (𝐴𝐴. 18) 
From equation (A.18), we obtain equation (20) in the body of the paper.  
 
